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Abstract 
Hope for an imminent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at an extreme 
low. The failure to reach a comprehensive peace agreement has precluded progress on 
cooperative water management. A new agreement on water could benefit both sides and help 
protect important water resources from environmental degradation, yet no talks have 
occurred outside of more difficult comprehensive negotiations. This has resulted in a 
humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip, lower quantities of quality drinking water for all 
Palestinians, and impediments in economic development. This paper argues through 
literature review and polling data that a new approach for negotiations is needed. Then, 
through interviews with experts, this paper recommends that starting a new round of 
negotiations with a separate track on water that is not contingent upon a final status 
agreement could be a path forward. Such an agreement could improve the lives of citizens on 
the ground, while simultaneously serving as a trust-building step between the two sides.     
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Executive Summary 
 
The outlook in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems to be at a turning point. 
Surrounding the latest round of negotiations, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, was a 
palpable sense that this could be the last chance for success of two-state negotiations led by 
the United States. The negotiations failed without so much as a framework agreement, and 
neither government currently seems interested in returning to negotiations. The challenge to 
the international community now lies in finding alternative methods to attempt to find a 
solution to the conflict, as well as bettering the lives of citizens on the ground. 
In the context of the breakdown of hope in the two-state solution, the issue of water 
has been neglected. Water is an issue that, relative to other issues such as borders, 
settlements, and refugees, is de-politicized and does not elicit emotional responses from 
either side. However, there is a sense that progress on the water issue has been held hostage 
by a failure to make progress in the overall peace negotiations. The result is a decrease in 
living standards and economic opportunity for Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip. 
Water is an area where Israelis and Palestinians have been able to cooperate, at least 
at a minimum level. Following an interim agreement on water in 1995, as part of the Oslo II 
stages of negotiations, a set of institutions were created to increase cooperation on water 
resources between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The agreement allocated water rights 
from the Mountain Aquifer, which lies primarily in the West Bank. 79% of the water was 
allocated to Israel and 21% of the water was allocated to the Palestinians. The agreement did 
not cover other water resources. This temporary agreement was supposed to last for 5 years 
and be renegotiated as part of final status negotiations, but has not been revisited since this 
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time. The most important of the institutions is the Joint Water Committee. The JWC is a 
committee that is comprised of an equal amount of Palestinians and Israelis. It has to approve 
all new water projects in the West Bank, with the inherent idea that both sides will have veto 
power over each other’s proposed water projects. As a result, it hoped to force the two sides 
into cooperation on water projects.  
While the JWC sounds like an equitable institution, there are complications in the fact 
that it only has jurisdiction on water from the Mountain Aquifer in Palestinian territory. The 
Mountain Aquifer is the only source of water for the Palestinians, yet is only important for 
Israelis in supplying water to settlements in the West Bank. The bulk of Israeli domestic 
water needs are supplied from different sources. In addition, the Palestinian Authority needs 
additional permits from the Israeli Civil Administration (a military government 
administration) for water projects in Area C of the West Bank. Area C is the area of the West 
Bank which is under full Israeli military control as stipulated by the Oslo Agreement, which 
was agreed to by the two sides in 1993.  
 While the set of water institutions has functioned, at least partially, cooperation on 
the committee broke down in 2010. Palestinian members of the JWC complained that Israeli 
members tied any approval of Palestinian projects to the successful approval of water 
projects for Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinians view these settlements as 
illegal and a major obstacle to peace. The Palestinian frustration caused by this tactic was 
compounded by widespread difficulties and delays in obtaining any sort of permit for water 
projects over a long period of time. The JWC has not convened since 2010. 
The results are a water shortage for many Palestinians. Citizens of the West Bank 
consume water at a lower rate than Israelis, as well as Israeli settlers in the West Bank. They 
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also face limited access to piped water, especially during the summer months, when 
prolonged periods of no access to water from pipes are common. In the Gaza Strip, the 
situation is more serious. The coastal aquifer, the one fresh water resource available, is at a 
high susceptibility for pollution by salinity due to its proximity to the coast. The natural 
potential for pollution is exacerbated by over-pumping and ineffective governance by the 
Hamas government ruling in Gaza, as well as by damage to water infrastructure as a result of 
Israeli-Hamas wars. 90-95% of water in Gaza is currently deemed unfit for consumption by 
World Health Organization standards, and the aquifer is projected to be completely unfit for 
consumption as early as 2016. Israel pumps water into the Gaza Strip in order to ease the 
humanitarian crisis.  
Israel, meanwhile, complains of illegal, un-permitted Palestinian drilling into water 
resources, which could pollute key water sources. They also maintain that they follow all 
voluntarily signed agreements between the two sides. There are also complaints about the 
failure of the Palestinian Authority to govern their water effectively, including leaky pipes 
and a failure to treat wastewater effectively. In addition, Israelis point to the improvement in 
water consumption for Palestinians since 1967, the year when Israelis gained control of water 
resources in the West Bank, and to their efforts in training the Palestinian Authority on 
managing water systems.  
The breakdown of cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel is best 
symbolized by the failure to supply the Palestinian city of Rawabi with water. Rawabi is the 
first planned city in the West Bank, an initiative of Palestinian-American businessman 
Bashar al-Masri. The city was designed to be a symbol of Palestinian ability to develop a 
functioning economy, and was purposely designed to not be a symbol of resistance against 
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Israelis. Many prominent Israeli politicians, including President Reuven Rivlin and Defense 
Minister Moshe Ya’alon, agreed that providing water to the city was in Israel’s interest. 
However, the city failed to gain water access for over a year after residents were supposed to 
start moving in, to the detriment of the Palestinian economy. The final approval for water 
access required the direct action of Prime Minister Benjamin Netayahu.    
 In this paper, after displaying the need for water reform, I then argue that prospects 
for a two-state solution have broken down due to a variety of factors. These include the 
increasing prevalence of Israeli settlement construction, the continued difficulty of dealing 
with a Palestinian government in which two competing parties have control over different 
geographical areas, and the re-election of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  
 Given the great need for a new water deal, as well as the lack of any prospects of 
obtaining a peace solution, I argue that negotiators should look into water negotiations for 
two reasons. The first is the obvious need for increased water access for Palestinians. The 
situation is most dire in Gaza. The inability of citizens to access water, exacerbated by the 
Israeli-Hamas war of summer 2014, threatens to develop into a humanitarian disaster. 
Reaching a deal on water would also help to ensure the long-term vitality of important water 
resources. The coastal aquifer in Gaza could incur irreversible damage by 2020 if current 
over-pumping is not remedied. In the West Bank, illegal drilling by Palestinians and over 
pumping of the Mountain Aquifer threatens to damage the water quality of the aquifer, which 
would affect both Israelis and Palestinians.  
 In determining the best manner of obtaining a new water deal, I originally hoped to 
conclude that a new deal could be reached by stand-alone negotiations on solely water. 
However, in interviewing experts on the topic, it became clear that the current political 
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situation is not conducive in holding a water summit between the governments. Instead, this 
paper advocates a two-pronged approach.  
The first step is a set of temporary measures to ease the humanitarian disaster in the 
Gaza Strip. This includes Israel allowing construction materials to enter Gaza to repair 
infrastructure, as well as to build massive desalination plants. Israel will also need to ensure a 
consistent electricity supply in order to operate wastewater treatment and desalination plants. 
The second step will require a fundamental shift in the political situation. When, if at all, 
there again comes a time when the international community leads two-state negotiations 
between two parties that are committed to reaching an agreement, I argue that the 
negotiations should be structured differently. At the beginning of negotiations, a separate 
discussion track should be established that focuses solely on water. This would be held 
simultaneously as the classic two-state, final agreement negotiation track. A new water deal 
should be focused on expanding cooperation on water resources to all sources that are 
available to Israelis and Palestinians, not just ones that are important to Palestinians. This 
will prevent Israelis from forcing Palestinians to recognize settlements in order to access 
water for their citizens, as well as create conditions that will increase mutually beneficial 
environmental cooperation. The implementation of a new water agreement should not be 
contingent upon a final status agreement. 
In the end, although this is not the ideal method of obtaining an agreement, the 
political situation requires creative solutions. A new water agreement could have a positive 
effect on the lives of citizens of both sides, mostly Palestinians. In addition, a new water 
agreement could potentially serve as a trust building exercise between the two sides, and spur 
both sides to cooperate on the larger, more difficult political issues.                
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Introduction 
 
The latest round of American-led negotiations to reach a two-state solution 
have once again failed. This failure to reach a secure agreement follows similar 
failures in 2000 at Camp David, the Road Map negotiations under President Bush 
culminating in the Annapolis conference of 2007, and then another round of 
failures early in the Obama administration. The peace process has been rumbling 
on since the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the historic Oslo Accords of 1993, 
yet in over 20 years there is still no sense of finality.  
Attached to the most recent round of negotiations was a palpable sense of 
fatality: this could be the final chance for an American-led peace process to be 
successful. There are several reasons for the pervasive sense of a coming 
paradigm-shift in the conflict. The first is the old adage about insanity: trying 
something again and again while expecting different results. But aside from this 
obvious trope, there are changing conditions on the ground that point to a desire 
to move away from a similar negotiation strategy. The most obvious is the Israel-
Hamas war over the summer of 2014, a violent conflict that caused large amounts 
of death and destruction in the Gaza Strip. The war contributed to the overall 
degradation of the relationship between the two sides. The Palestinian Authority 
has recently signed the Rome Statute and joined the International Criminal Court, 
threatening to make complaints against Israel for war crimes. Such a move would 
certainly cause complications for Israeli leaders wishing to participate in peace 
negotiations. Meanwhile, Israeli settlement construction makes drawing a map 
that would provide a contiguous Palestinian state more difficult. Beyond this, the 
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recent re-election of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shows that the Israeli 
public is not currently seriously interested in a two-state solution. 
Observers and political actors are beginning to examine new methods 
which will help bring an end to the conflict. There is a lot of talk regarding 
“internationalizing” the conflict, with many voices claiming that America has lost 
the ability to be considered an unbiased mediator.1 The BDS (Boycotts, 
Divestments, and Sanctions) movement is the leading face of a growing call for 
Palestinians to turn to non-violent resistance against Israel, in place of a new 
intifada. The movement is gaining popularity both worldwide and in America.2 
Meanwhile, cooperation on water between the Palestinian Authority and 
the Israeli government has broken down. The challenge of allocating water 
resources between the two peoples began in 1967, when Israeli forces took 
control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the Golan Heights from Syria. 
As part of this territorial capture, they gained control to the mountain aquifer in 
the West Bank and the Coastal Aquifer in the Gaza Strip. The situation remained 
the same until the Oslo agreement of 1993, and the follow up Oslo II agreement 
of 1995. The deal allocated specific amounts of water to each side, and was 
supposed to be a temporary deal lasting five years. It also noted the legitimacy of 
Palestinian desire to eventually own and control their own water resources. Due to 
the failure of progress in the Oslo peace process, the deal has not been revisited in 
the 20 years since the agreement.  
The Oslo II agreement of 1995 created several institutions to facilitate 
cooperation on water infrastructure development between the two sides. From 
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1995, the time of their inception, until 2010, the institutions were a symbol of the 
possibility of functional cooperation between the two sides. However, in 2010, the 
Joint Water Commission, the most prominent of the new institutions, ceased to 
meet. Israeli members of the JWC had made the approval of Palestinian projects 
contingent upon the approval of water projects made for Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank. In 2010, Palestinian members of the JWC announced they would no 
longer approve any of these projects, and the commission broke down.  
As a result of the dysfunction, the supply of water to Palestinians falls well 
short of the supply of water to Israelis. In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
residents routinely face periods when there is no water running through their 
pipes, especially during summer months. Many Palestinians still have no access to 
the water grid at all. They are then forced to buy expensive water delivered by 
truck from the Israeli water company Mekerot. West Bank Palestinians consume 
about 70 liters of water a day, falling short of the minimum 100 liters a day 
recommended by the World Health Organization. In the Gaza Strip, the situation 
is worse, and rapidly deteriorating. The sole domestic water source in Gaza is the 
coastal aquifer. The aquifer, as a result of its proximity to the ocean and over-
pumping by the Hamas-led government, is highly contaminated by salty water. 
An estimated 90% of the water is unfit to drink by humans. The aquifer could be 
entirely unusable by as early as 2016. Israel has recently announced that it will 
double the amount of water it pumps into Gaza each year.  
Despite the recently bleak turn the water situation has taken, Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority have shown an ability to cooperate on the issue in the past. 
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Water is not an extremely emotional issue that deals with core identities, such as 
Jerusalem or the fate of Palestinian refugees. This makes striking a deal between 
the two sides immeasurably easier. In addition, the severity of the situation, 
especially in Gaza, mandates a shift in water relations between the two sides. 
This paper examines the relationship between the decreasing confidence in 
reaching a two-state solution on both sides and the breakdown of cooperation in 
water institutions. I argue that there is a correlation between the breakdown of 
cooperation on water and a declining faith on both sides that a two-state deal will 
be reached. This degradation in confidence is marked by several key political 
events, including Hamas gaining power in Gaza, the re-election of Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, and the several Israeli-Gaza conflicts. Polling data also 
suggests that the publics on both sides have low faith in an agreement being 
struck, especially in the short term.   
One goal of this paper is to examine ways in which the issue of water can 
be separated out from the overall peace process. The idea that water has been held 
hostage by the peace process is advocated by groups such as environmental NGO 
Friends of the Earth Middle East.3 With a broken water management system that 
has no hopes of reform due to stagnation in overall relations between the Israelis 
and Palestinian, Palestinians are often desperate for water. This leads to 
conditions which make important water resources vulnerable to pollution, which 
would hurt both Israelis and Palestinians. In return, this paper then examines if 
reaching a deal on water could spur the two sides to greater cooperation.  
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I ultimately come to recommend a two-pronged approach to work on 
improving the issue of water. What is immediately needed is emergency steps 
taken by the Israeli government and the international community to prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, as well as prevent irreparable damage to the 
Coastal Aquifer. I then argue that, given the current political situation, a stand-
alone water deal without the context of two-state solutions is unachievable. 
However, if two-state negotiations are to be resumed, I argue that the international 
community should begin the push for a water deal, which is not contingent upon a 
final status agreement. Comprehensive two-state negotiations would have to serve 
as a vehicle to achieve a new water deal. In return, the successful completion of a 
water agreement could serve to build trust between the two sides, helping to push 
forward the two-state negotiations.    
In this paper, I first detail the political framework for managing water in 
its current state. Then I examine the performance of this framework in terms of 
the functioning of water institutions, actual water usage, and cost of water. 
Context is provided through the examination of Israeli water history and attitudes, 
as well as water relations with other states. I use the case study of Rawabi as a 
poignant example of how failure in water cooperation has negatively affected the 
Palestinian economy. Shifting, I then argue that two-state, American-led 
negotiations have broken down, and do not have any realistic prospects of 
succeeding in the near future. This leads me to the argument that an alternative 
method of negotiations could be a separate water deal between the two sides.  
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It is important to note that I am not suggesting the concept of a solely 
“economic peace.” Any water negotiation should be followed by subsequent 
movements toward increasing Palestinian sovereignty. 
 
The Current Framework 
 
The last comprehensive water agreement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians was reached in 1995 during the Oslo II negotiations. This agreement 
was temporary in nature and was intended to be re-negotiated at the end of a five 
year period. It divided up water resources stemming from the Mountain Aquifer, 
which lies primarily in the West Bank. At the time of the agreement, Israel was 
allocated rights to 483 of the 679 million cubic meters of water produced yearly 
by the aquifer. Palestine was allocated the rights to 118 MCM of water produced 
by the aquifer, and the right to develop 78 MCM more. This leaves Israel with the 
rights to 71% of the water produced by the aquifer, while Palestine has the rights 
29% of the water.4  
The agreement did not include Palestinian water rights to any other 
sources of water, including the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, or the Sea of Galilee. 
The coastal aquifer is the only domestic source of water in the Gaza Strip, and is 
solely managed by the local government.5 
The mountain aquifer is divided into three regions: the Eastern aquifer, the 
Northeastern Aquifer and the Western Aquifer. The Eastern aquifer has an annual 
recharge of 172 MCM. At the time of the agreement, Israelis were allocated 40 
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MCM of water, while Palestinians were allocated 54 MCM, and an additional 78 
MCM to be developed. The Northeastern Aquifer has an annual recharge of 145 
MCM. Israelis were allocated 103 MCM and Palestinians were allocated 32 
MCM per year. The Western aquifer, the largest sub-aquifer, has an annual 
recharge of 362 MCM. Israel was allocated 340 MCM and Palestine was 
allocated 20 MCM per year.6  
 
Image Source: http://infohost.nmt.edu/~lynnek/w10sp/modLoader.php?mod=07&sec=5&pg=4 
An interesting aspect of the water deal between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians is the concept of the rights of owning the water. In the interim 
agreement between the two parties, the Israelis state, “Israel recognizes the 
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank.” However, they pushed back the issue 
of ownership of these water resources to a permanent status agreement, which has 
never been reached. Palestinian water officials have spoken about their desire to 
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obtain increased ownership of the water sources that lie in the West Bank. When 
future discussions of water take place, Palestinian leaders are likely to work 
toward owning their water territories, along with the general aim of controlling 
their own territories.7 In the Gaza Strip, however, Palestinians were granted 
complete control and ownership over water and sewage systems, with the 
exception of projects designed to serve Israeli settlements, which have since been 
evacuated.8 
The Oslo II water agreement is also guided by principles of coordination 
between the two sides in a manner that would maximize water benefits for all. In 
order to do this, the agreement shifted responsibility of managing Palestinian 
water and sewage resources from the Israeli military government to the new 
Palestinian Authority. This was significant because water was the first agreement 
reached under the Oslo II phase of negotiations, and signaled a general shift in 
transferring responsibilities to a Palestinian political entity, rather than an Israeli 
military government in the occupied territories.9 
In order to manage the water infrastructure of the West Bank, the Oslo II 
agreement set up several new institutions. On the Palestinian side, a Palestinian 
Water Authority was created with the mission of increasing water supply to 
Palestinians. The PWA is run by the Palestinian National Authority, a governing 
body also created by the Oslo treaties. They were to be responsible for the 
planning and implementation of all new water projects in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. Following the agreement, one main strategy of the PWA was to seek 
foreign aid in order to assist in their efforts to provide Palestinians with an 
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increase in quality water supply. Of the $2.5 billion of aid pledged to the 
Palestinian Authority, $385 million was directed for use in water and sanitation 
projects. $58 million of this money was from the United States Agency for 
International Development. Along with this money, USAID also provided a 
significant amount of technical support and knowledge, largely through hiring 
American contractors to help design and implement the projects.10 
In addition to the PWA, another institution named the Joint Water 
Committee was created to coordinate water projects between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. The JWC is comprised of 6 members, with 3 Israeli members and 3 
Palestinian members. Any proposals for new water projects on the Mountain 
Aquifer have to be approved by the JWC. The idea of the committee is that 
Israelis and Palestinians were to come to consensus on each other’s water 
projects, ensuring that water resources were managed in a manner that was 
beneficial to both sides.11   
In addition to the JWC, the Oslo II treaty set up at least five Joint 
Supervision and Enforcement Teams to monitor and ensure water regulations and 
project guidelines were being followed throughout the West Bank. Each JSET 
team was assigned to have at least two members from both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. Interestingly, in the initial agreement, each side was instructed to 
travel in separate vehicles unless otherwise agreed upon. This signal of pessimism 
in the agreement exemplifies the difficulty of getting officials from both sides to 
work together in such close proximity.12  
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How the Oslo Water Agreement Has Functioned 
 
The most obvious fault in the water section of the Oslo II treaty is the fact 
that it was never designed to last for more than a temporary period of 5 years. 
Coinciding with the breakdown of the Oslo process following the assassination of 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the supposedly temporary agreement was 
never re-negotiated. The water allotments to both Israel and Palestinians are based 
on the populations of 1995, not accounting for approximately 20 years of 
population growth. The concept of Palestinians “owning” their water, which was 
recognized by Israel in the Oslo II treaty as a legitimate desire, was never 
revisited. Instead, all of the water contained in the Mountain Aquifer is 
technically owned by Mekorot, Israel’s national water company. Ownership of the 
water resources from the Mountain Aquifer was transferred in 1982 to Mekorot 
from the Israeli government, which had acquired the aquifer during the 6 Day 
War of 1967.13 
The Joint Water Commission has received mix reviews. Friends of the 
Earth Middle East, an NGO dedicated to working with environmental issues in 
the area, states that “the joint water committee is the only committee of 5 final 
status committees that had some semblance of working.”14 The committee has 
found some success in working cooperatively to approve water projects for both 
Israelis and Palestinians. In the context of the situation of water management pre-
Oslo, it is encouraging that Palestinians have been given some control in the 
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process of developing and managing water resources in the area that they 
officially govern.  
However, the JWC process has been criticized in many manners, mostly 
from the Palestinian side. One of the primary faults of the process is that any 
water projects involving work in land which is designated as Area C under the 
Oslo accords, which contains somewhere between 72-74% of the territory in the 
West Bank, requires an additional permit process. Since the area is technically 
controlled by the Israeli military, any water resource projects are required to 
obtain additional approval from the Israeli civil administration, following 
approval by the JWC.15 The PWA claims that Israel requires the additional step to 
slow down water development. They claim that Israel has, in effect, a double veto 
on any Palestinian water projects in Area C, and that “Israel uses ICA permits to 
make it virtually impossible for Palestinians to drill new wells in Area C – where 
the best water extraction points are located.”16  
In addition, there are several qualms about how the JWC works. In the 
Western Aquifer, the largest and most plentiful region of the Mountain Aquifer, 
not a single Palestinian well project has been approved. For projects that do get 
approved, the PWA complains of complicated, delayed permit processes which 
require several permits in order to complete one project: for example, a permit to 
build a road to get to the worksite, as well as several permits to complete the 
work. 17  
Another major flaw in the JWC process is the seeming reality that 
approval of Palestinian water projects has been contingent upon the approval of 
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water projects in the West Bank that benefit Israeli settlements. The PWA claims 
that Palestinian members of the JWC are forced to approve Israeli settlement 
projects on Palestinian land in order to provide more usable water for their 
constituents. In a 2013 study by researcher Dr. Richard Selby, he found that the 
approval rate for drilling wells that benefit Israeli settlers was 100%, while 
approval for drilling wells that benefit Palestinians was 66%. Similarly, 100% of 
projects building water supply networks for Israelis were approved, while 50-80% 
of Palestinian water supply networks were approved. 96% of wastewater 
treatment plants for Israelis were approved, compared to 58% of such projects for 
Palestinians. According to the PWA, in 2010 the Palestinians refused to approve 
water projects that benefitted Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Both Dr. Selby and 
the PWA claim that following the stoppage of approval for settlement water 
projects, the Israeli members of the JWC refused to approve Palestinian water 
projects. The work of the JWC came to a stalemate.18 
Dr. Selby’s study found that a total of 174 water projects for Palestinians 
were approved, totaling a capacity of 167,950 cubic centimeters, compared to 28 
settler projects approved for a total of 132,250 cubic centimeters of water. At the 
time of the study, the Palestinian population was seven times that of the Israeli 
settler community in the West Bank. Another disparity between the water projects 
of the two groups was the waiting time for approval of projects. An average wait 
time for approval of Palestinian water projects was 11 months, compared to a 2 
month wait time for Israeli projects.1920 
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Dr. Selby asserts that the reason for the disparities found in the JWC is 
based upon the unequal power each side has in the committee. Palestinian water 
supply in the West Bank is entirely dependent on the Mountain Aquifers. To 
access this water, Palestinians have to apply for permits to the JWC. In theory, 
Palestinians have veto power over construction of Israeli water infrastructure as 
well. However, the Israelis can access water without approval from the JWC from 
several other sources, including the Jordan River, the sections of the Coastal and 
Mountain Aquifers which are inside the Green Line, and various smaller aquifers 
in Israel proper. The only need for Israel to apply for JWC approval is to build 
water projects designed to benefit settlements in the West Bank. This power 
asymmetry has resulted in the differences seen in project approval, construction, 
and water supply on both sides.21  
Palestinians also feel that Israel refuses to consider new projects that could 
help to ameliorate what they feel is a water shortage for Palestinians in the West 
Bank. An example of this is a Palestinian proposal for project at the Al-Fashkha 
Springs, a set of springs on the western coast of the Dead Sea that the PWA 
claims are a southeastern end of the Mountain aquifer. The PWA states that these 
springs have a flow of 100-110 MCM of water each year that could provide 
substantial help in supplying water throughout the West Bank. However, they 
have been unable to access this resource due to the refusal of the JWC to approve 
any projects at this site.22 
Palestinians in the West Bank also have complaints regarding their water 
supply that do not involve the JWC process. A common accusation against Israeli 
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forces is the destruction of small-scale, largely single-home water-storage tanks 
that families rely on for drinking and bathing water. The international charity 
organization Oxfam has stated several times that cisterns, large plastic containers 
used to collect rainwater, often serve as a target for Israeli soldiers. Bullets from 
the soldiers break holes in the cisterns, rendering them useless. There have been 
several examples of Israeli forces systematically destroying cisterns in villages 
that depend on them for water supply. In 2003, Oxfam claimed that Israeli forces 
destroyed a cistern in the village of El Boursh because they needed the land to 
build a wall. This cistern would have served half the village.23 More recently, in 
August 2012 the Israeli Defense Forces was accused of destroying four water 
cisterns, as well as two houses and six stables, in a small seven-family village 
named Zenuta in the Southern West Bank.24 The United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs states that 46 cisterns were destroyed in 
2011.25 There are numerous tales of Israelis destroying cisterns, often built with 
international funding, for a lack of building permits that are largely inaccessible to 
Palestinian families.26  
The Israeli government has repeatedly insisted that they follow all 
international agreements, and are charitable with aiding in developing water 
resources in the West Bank. In a May 2013 statement, the Israeli Water Authority 
made several rebuttals to a report by Palestinian Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organization Al Haq that claimed that Israelis use water as a 
political weapon. These arguments include:  
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• Israeli usage of the Mountain Aquifer is lower than the pre-1967 era while 
Palestinian usage of water has surged during this period 
• Settlers in the West Bank consume less water than the amount of water 
that Israel transfers to the West Bank 
• Palestinians consume 190 MCM of water per year compared to 118 MCM 
per year when the initial water agreement was signed 
• 95% of Palestinians are connected to the water grid today as compared to 
less than 10% pre-1967 
• Palestinians living in West Bank cities have higher access to water 
resources than most Arab neighbors 
• The JWC is an institution that was agreed upon by both sides in which 
both sides have equal veto power 
• Israel holds trainings for Palestinians on wastewater treatment, 
reclamation and desalination 
• The Palestinian Authority states that they lose 33% of water throughout 
their network, which is not influenced by Israeli actions 
• The Palestinian Authority does not treat its wastewater, going against the 
1995 water agreement 
• If the PA reduced water losses and treated their wastewater, the amount of 
water available to Palestinians would increase by at least 60 MCM per 
year 
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An overarching claim of the Israeli refutation is that the Palestinians are not 
actually interested in improving Palestinian access to water resources, but instead 
are focused on turning the water issue into a political one.27 
 
Actual Usage and Costs 
 
While there is debate as to who is at fault for water usage discrepancies, it 
is very obvious that there are stark differences between the amount of water used 
by Israelis and Palestinians. The aforementioned Al Haq report of April 2013 
states that Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem 
consume an average of 73 liters of water per day. They contend that Israelis 
consume an average of 300 liters per day. The minimum average water 
consumption per day recommended by the World Health Organization is 100 
liters per day. Al Haq estimates that Israeli settlers in the West Bank use six times 
the amount of water as Palestinians living in the West Bank, despite the fact that 
there were 500,000 settlers at the time of the report compared to 2.6 million 
Palestinians.28   
Israeli Human Rights Organization B’Tselem published a report in March 
of 2014 detailing what they viewed as “Discriminatory Water Supply.” They state 
that of the 118 MCM of water pledged to the Palestinians under the Oslo II 
Accords, they only access approximately 73% of that amount. This results in 
Israelis accessing 86% of the water available in the Mountain Aquifer, while the 
Palestinians are only able to use the remaining 14% of the Aquifer. The 
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organization also estimates that there are roughly 113,000 Palestinians in some 70 
villages throughout the West Bank that are not connected with the water grid at 
all. The average water consumption of these 113,000 people varies between 20-50 
liters a day, less than half of what is recommended by the World Health 
Organization. The Israeli Water Authority estimates that Israelis consume an 
average of 173 liters of water per day.29 
Palestinians in the West Bank who are connected to the water grid also 
often face the prospect of having to obtain their water from alternative sources. 
B’Tselem describes how the Palestinian Water Authority often does not have 
enough water to supply to all of its citizens. It instead has to turn to rolling water 
supplies, rotating through villages.  
In addition, Palestinians in East Jerusalem also face the potential of long 
water outages, even though their water supply is controlled by the Israeli Water 
Authority. One notable example of a long-term water outage began in March of 
2014 in four Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem:  Ras Shehada, Ras 
Khamis, Dahyat A’salam and the Shuafat Refugee Camp. For three weeks in 
March, the four neighborhoods were not able to access water at all.30 As of 
January 2015, the four neighborhoods were still facing continuing problems in 
gaining consistent access to water from their pipes, a problem lasting over 10 
months.31 This is compared to Israeli neighborhoods in the same city, which have 
not faced any notable disruptions over the same period of time. 80% of the 
residents of these four neighborhoods live under the poverty line, yet are forced to 
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turn to expensive alternatives such as bottled water in order to obtain enough 
water to subsist on.  
In the Gaza Strip, the situation is dire. Gaza only has one domestic water 
source, the Coastal Aquifer, which can be accessed by both Israelis and 
Palestinians on different ends. In a February 2014 report, B’Tselem detailed that 
90% of water in the Gaza Strip was not suitable for drinking, or even agricultural 
uses. Approximately 180 MCM of water are pumped from the aquifer yearly, yet 
the annual recharge of the aquifer is approximately 50-60 MCM. This drastic 
over-pumping causes great damage to the aquifer, especially given its proximity 
to the ocean. Brine and salt water seeps into the aquifer, making it unsafe to 
drink.32 The United Nations Environmental Program has estimated that if current 
pumping rates continue, the Coastal Aquifer may be entirely unfit for supply 
drinking water by 2016, and the damage could be irreversible by 2020. A long-
term plan is needed to entirely eliminate the need for pumping water from the 
Coastal Aquifer in order for the Aquifer to provide any amount of clean drinking 
water to the citizens of Gaza in the long-term.33     
The over-pumping problem is compounded by the lack of effective 
sewage treatment facilities, as well as a failure to construct and operate large-
scale desalination plants. According to B’Tselem, only 25%, or 30,000 cubic 
meters per day, of wastewater is treated effectively. The other 90,000 cubic 
meters per day that is not treated can seep into the coastal aquifer as well as the 
Mediterranean Sea, contributing to the degradation of Gazan water supplies. A 
large problem in attempting to effectively treat wastewater is the need for constant 
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electricity supply. Gaza often suffers from electricity blackouts, rendering it near 
impossible to effectively treat the required amount of wastewater.34 
Desalination plants are often looked to as the only short-term practical 
solution in easing the imminent water crisis. In March of 2014, the European 
Union and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) launched a project to 
build a desalination plant that could provide drinking water to 75,000 people in 
the Gaza Strip. It is expected to begin generating drinkable water in 2016.35 
Environmental activists claim talks about a large scale desalination plant began in 
1996, yet due to political difficulties construction did not begin until this time.36  
In the absence of large-scale desalination plants, many Gazans are forced 
to purchase water from small-scale, private desalination companies. The water 
from these companies, which are often run illegally, is not well-regulated. It is 
often not adequately desalinated, or is contaminated by other pollutants. This 
contaminated drinking water leads to negative health consequences for the 
residents who drink the water, including kidney disease and osteoporosis. Similar 
to the process of treating wastewater, desalination requires a large supply of 
energy, which is not readily available in the Gaza Strip.37 
The existing water problems in Gaza have been highly exacerbated by the 
three wars with Israel since 2007. Prior to the wars, access to piped water was 
already intermittent at best. B’Tselem described the situation prior to the war: 
although there was improvement in increasing access of Gazan homes to the 
piping system, “Households receive running water for only six to eight hours at a 
time: 25% of households on a daily basis, 40% every other day, 20% once every 
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three days, and the remaining 15% (in Gaza City, Rafah and Jabaliya) only one 
day out of four.”38  
During the war of summer 2014, bombing in Gaza damaged water 
infrastructure on a wide scale. Damage to water pipes, sewage treatment plants, 
and electrical production plants severely restricted access to water for citizens of 
Gaza. Oxfam International, a global anti-poverty group, reported that during the 
war ¼ of Gazan citizens, or 450,000 people, had no access to running water.39 At 
least twenty-six wells, which already had highly saline water, and six purification 
centers were damaged during the war. Due to the lack of usable water, there were 
widespread reports of negative health consequences. In addition to effects from 
dehydration, a lack of water for bathing purposes led to an outbreak of skin 
diseases and other infections.40 Extensive damage done to the wastewater 
treatment system, including pipelines and treatment plants, led to the presence of 
an estimated 15,000 tons of solid waste in the streets of Gaza.41   
In August 2014, following the war in Gaza, the Palestinian Water 
Authority published a report detailing the damage caused to the water system due 
to bombing. The Damage Assessment Report estimated that 34.343 million US 
dollars’ worth of visible damage was done to the water system in Gaza as a result 
of the war. In addition to the obvious damage, the DAR also estimated the cost of 
water services that had to be provided to the residents of Gaza as a result of 
interrupted water service. In the first six months following the war, an estimated 
30.826 million US dollars would have to be spent in order to restore the water 
system to at least a semi-operational state. To fully restore the water and 
   21 
 
 
wastewater systems that were damaged by the war, the estimated cost is 32.96 
MUSD. Finally, the PWA estimates a cost of $620 million in developing a long 
term, sustainable water system that can deliver an adequate water supply to the 
citizens of Gaza, along with a governance system to maintain it.42 
A troubling aspect of water maintenance during Operation Protective Edge 
for the PWA was the safety of their workers. The PWA claimed that they 
coordinated with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to carry 
out the needed repairs to the water system without violence against their workers. 
However, the PWA states that seven technicians working for the Coastal 
Municipalities Water Utility and Municipal Water Departments of local 
governments were killed by Israeli bombs while attempting to carry out repairs to 
water systems. This violence led to reticence on the part of the PWA in sending 
out technicians to attempt to make needed repairs to the water system during the 
war.43  
Israel has displayed a strong interest in maintaining a supply of adequate 
drinking water to the Gaza strip. In March of 2015, Israel announced that it would 
begin pumping 10 million cubic meters of water into the Gaza Strip each year. 
This doubled the previous amount of 5 MCM that Israel pumped into Gaza each 
year.44 Doubling the water supply was advocated by many groups, such as noted 
American liberal-pro-Israel advocacy group J-Street, who urged the Israeli 
government to increase the amount of water available to Gazan citizens. J Street 
says that Israel has three water pipelines running into Gaza, yet one is entirely 
shut off. J Street urged Israel to double the amount of water they supplied to Gaza 
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by turning this water on. In addition, J Street urges Israel to increase the amount 
of electricity supplied to the Gaza Strip in order to better treat their wastewater 
and cut back on the amount of sewage seeping into the streets, a problem which 
they claim affects Israel as well.45  
 
 
Rawabi: A study in Dysfunction 
  
In 2008, following the Palestine Development Conference, Palestinian 
businessman Bashar Al-Masri began formulating a project to create the first 
planned city in the West Bank. The city was named Rawabi, and was planned to 
be built between Ramallah and Nablus in Area A (under jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority). Al-Masri, the owner of a company named Masser 
International which works in real estate and finance, raised funds in part from 
Qatari real estate companies as well as the Qatari royal family.46 The United 
States Agency for International Development was also involved in providing 
funding for the project, pledging $5 million for the building of roads and retaining 
walls.47 
         The city was designed to be a symbol of a self-sufficient Palestinian State. It 
includes many Western-style amenities, such as an amphitheater, schools, 
playgrounds, a country club, a technological park and more. There were plans to 
import a water purification system from Israel to produce water that could be used 
for irrigation and in local homes. When asked about his motivations for building 
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the city, Al-Masri stated the following: “The Palestinian state will be established. 
It’s just a matter of time. The question is only when and what kind of state it will 
be. Will it be like those countries in Africa that subsist off donations and aid, or 
will we be a progressive state, home to corporations that are traded on the 
Nasdaq? Our preference is obvious, which is why Massar is investing in 
Palestine.” The Palestinian Authority pledged support for the project, committing 
to build transportation, electricity, and water infrastructure, as well as providing 
basic services such as education, health and security.48  
Al-Masri faced criticism from the Palestinian Boycotts, Divestments and 
Sanctions movement for the planned construction of Rawabi. The movement saw 
the construction of Rawabi as too tied to normalization with Israel, abandoning 
what they saw as the spirit of Palestinian resistance. For example, they decried the 
donation of 300 trees to Rawabi from the Jewish National Fund as well as the 
involvement of certain Israelis in providing counsel to the city, such as a chief 
legal adviser who was previously a senior advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon. In response to the criticism, Al-Masri stated that no Israeli construction 
companies were used, but the Israeli companies provided some of the raw 
materials. While city administrators accepted the lowest bid possible for most of 
the raw materials, they claimed that they refused to work with any companies that 
were involved with the construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.49  
The city is designed to eventually hold 40,000 residents when entirely 
finished50, and hold 25,000 in the first phase of construction.51 600 Palestinian 
citizens were planning on moving in by the end of 2014. The city is planned to 
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contain 25,000 housing units. Architecturally, the city more closely resembles 
Israeli settlements than traditional Palestinian cities, another concern for 
Palestinian activists concerned with Rawabi’s normalization implications.52 Most 
of the early purchasers of Rawabi housing units were middle and upper-middle 
class Palestinians, although Al-Masri maintains that Rawabi is open to Jews and 
Christians as well as Muslims. Most of the planned early residents of the city 
were married couples and families, although there was a significant number of 
singles who were largely interested in purchasing housing units in Rawabi for 
investment purposes.53 
While investors were expected to be able to move in around mid-2014, the 
administrators of Rawabi faced a major issue: working with Israeli institutions to 
provide the city with running water. At first there was a delay in reaching a deal 
between the Israeli and Palestinian Water Authorities on the topic of Rawabi. This 
step was seemingly the most difficult obstacle to overcome in the long process of 
attaching the city to the water grid, and once a deal was reached in early 
September 2014 it seemed as if the water access was imminent.54 However, 
following this approval, right-wing Israeli settler groups began decrying the city’s 
access to water. These groups had opposed the construction of the city all along, 
stating that it represented a security threat due to the ability of a citizen of Rawabi 
to be able to see a large chunk of the Israeli coast, including the cities of Tel Aviv 
and Ashkelon. This discontent increased following Operation Protective Edge, in 
which the extent of the tunnels built by Hamas in the Gaza Strip was revealed. 
Right-wing groups were also wary of Rawabi’s funding ties to the Qatari 
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government, which they viewed as a staunch enemy. The delay in water access 
continued, and Al-Masri was forced to stop continuing construction on a city 
which was already supposed to be housing residents.55 
Pressure coming from the right-wing settlement groups resulted in the 
delay of approval from the Israeli Civil Administration, the military authorities 
responsible for government administration in the West Bank. However, in January 
of 2015, Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Major 
General Yoav Mordecai announced approval of water access for Rawabi. Once 
again, it seemed as if water was finally coming to the planned metropolis. Al-
Masri released a newsletter to the apartment holders of Rawabi, where 639 units 
were completed and ready to be inhabited. Yet, once again, a significant 
stumbling block was presented in the form of Israeli Minister of National 
Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources Silvan Shalom. Shalom, a member 
of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party, had come under pressure 
from right-wing settler groups to halt the project, which he had capacity to do as 
the head official of the Israeli water sector.56 
Minister Shalom stated that the approval of water access for Rawabi was 
contingent on the approval of the Joint Water Council. However, the Joint Water 
Council has not met since 2010 amid Israeli insistence that approval of Palestinian 
water projects was contingent upon approval of new projects for Israeli 
settlements. Shalom deemed that the approval by the JWC was necessary, 
claiming that by bypassing the committee he could “jeopardize the foundations” 
of the water institution. Meanwhile, Attorney Dov Weisglass, main legal advisor 
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to Al-Masri and former senior Advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, 
claims that not a single water project to an Israeli settlement was held up over the 
5 year period of JWC inactivity. In addition, there were also reports that if Rawabi 
water were to be approved without the reconvening of the JWC, the Israeli 
government gave assurances to the settlement group the Yesha Council that they 
would approve several water projects for settlements in the West Bank.57 
The continued delay in water access had significant negative economic 
effects. Al-Masri claimed that he invested almost the entirety of his wealth into 
the city, and was at risk of personally becoming bankrupt. Weisglass stated that 
over 500 construction workers were laid off as a result in the halt in construction. 
He also threatened a massive lawsuit against the Israeli government if they 
ultimately failed to establish the water connection to Rawabi and the project went 
bankrupt. The Palestinian Authority was depending on the project as an economic 
boost to the surrounding areas, providing services and generating quality jobs. 
There were also the large amount of families and investors who had purchased 
housing units and were expecting to move in that were caught in limbo waiting 
for Israeli water approval.58  
The approval of water to the system became a large political issue, and 
gained support from unlikely Israeli sources. Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, 
also of the Likud party and a noted right-wing politician, gave his blessing and 
was involved in the Maj Gen Mordechai’s approval of the project.59 President 
Rueven Rivlin, who has previously spoken out against the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state, stated that Israel should provide water to Rawabi, 
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noting that Israel is providing water to the settlements in the West Bank. He also 
went as far as to add that “Rawabi is in the interest of Israel.”60 
Finally, in late February 2015, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
personally intervened and ordered that Israel connect Rawabi to the water system. 
Ahead of Israeli elections, it is speculated that Netanyahu saw the failure to 
approve water access for Rawabi as an embarrassing issue, especially in his 
relations with the American government. Beyond the Obama administration, 
Netanyahu also faced questions from American Jewish interest groups regarding 
what they saw as the failure of Israel to support a peaceful Palestinian attempt at 
domestic economic development. In addition, Israeli defense agencies were afraid 
that the failure to support the opening of Rawabi could increase the likelihood that 
the Palestinian Authority would take the step of cutting off security cooperation 
with Israel.61 Despite all of these reasons to approve the Rawabi water project, the 
JWC never successfully reconvened to approve the project, and Netanyahu had to 
intervene himself.62 
This, ultimately, is what Rawabi represents. The breakdown of a water 
system created by Oslo II that had previously, at least to a degree, represented an 
area where Israel and Palestine could demonstrate an ability to functionally 
cooperate on governance issues.   
 
 
 
Israeli Attitudes towards Water and Relations with Other States 
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In the traditional early Zionist attitude, water was treated as a resource to 
be valued. Early Zionist visionaries pictured Israel as an agricultural state that tied 
the people to the land. Because the land was situated in an arid, desert region, 
efficient use of water was necessary for the flourishing of an agricultural state. 
Early Israelis, therefore, treated water as a scarce resource which was to be valued 
and reused at all costs.  The government in the early period of the state of Israel 
had a large role in expanding agriculture as a means of building a state. They also, 
therefore, had a large hand in regulating water usage as well as discovering new 
water resources. Israelis worked at developing technology and methods which 
would increase water efficiency and allow them to reuse as much water as 
possible. These technologies include drip irrigation, treating and reusing sewage 
water, and desalination of water from the Mediterranean Sea.63    
Included in this plan was the need to develop a well-functioning, widely 
encompassing set of government institutions which oversaw the management and 
allocation of water resources. Part of these early water institutions were two 
important corporations which were partially owned by the government and were 
under the authority of the Israeli Water Commission Administration. One 
corporation, Tahal, was placed in charge of the overall planning of Israeli water 
supply. The other, Mekerot, was placed in charge of the construction of all 
irrigation and supply projects for Israeli water systems. These corporations, as 
well as other groups which hoped to exploit water systems, all had to get permits 
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for projects from the Israeli Water Commission. The Israeli Water Commission is 
under the Ministry of Agriculture.64 
The more prominent corporation today is Mekerot, which is currently in 
control of all water resources in the Mountain Aquifer. Mekerot was founded in 
1936 by the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut Labour Federation. Over time, the 
Israeli government acquired some stake in the company, which has also 
traditionally been largely co-owned by organizations such as the Jewish National 
Fund.65 Today, it continues to operate as a partially-government-owned company 
with exclusive rights to Israeli-controlled water resources.66 
An early example of Israel’s international involvement in water affairs is 
the so-called Johnston Plan, negotiated by American Special Envoy Eric Johnston 
at the direction of President Dwight Eisenhower. The plan was negotiated at the 
request of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for the Palestinian 
Refugees and was an effort to reduce tensions and outbreaks of violence that were 
prevalent between Israelis and Arabs in 1953. Johnston formulated a plan and 
used shuttle diplomacy to reach an agreement with an Arab Technical Committee 
formed by the Arab League as well as an Israeli team of technical representatives. 
Although the Arab Technical Committee approved of the plan, it never actually 
gained political approval at a higher level with the Arab League. However, both 
the American and Israeli governments functionally operated as if the plan were 
accepted until the war of 1967. The plan divided the resources of the Jordan River 
and its main tributary, the Yarmouk River, between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and 
Israel according to irrigation need. It did not address groundwater resources.67 
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Concurrently at this time, planning of an Israeli project named the 
National Water Carrier began. The planning for the Carrier started in 1949, 
diversion of water in order to feed the Carrier started in 1951, major construction 
on the Carrier started in 1953, and the project was completed in 1964. The project 
was designed to carry water from the water-dense Northern region throughout the 
country, specifically to the more arid Southern region of Israel. The water used in 
the carrier included water diverted from the Jordan River. This diversion sparked 
tensions and small conflicts with Syria, leading to the conditions that necessitated 
the negotiation of the Johnston Plan. The National Water Carrier is a symbol of 
the Israeli attitude towards water at the time: the challenge with water resources is 
delivery-based, and the solution is building infrastructure that can deliver existing 
water resources to needed areas.68           
By the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, it seems that a shift in the way Israelis 
viewed their challenges facing water had occurred. As Israeli domestic water use 
increased, and was projected to increase even further, Israelis went from being 
primarily concerned with the distribution of water to being primarily concerned 
with acquiring a higher amount of total water resources. The extent to which 
water played a role in provoking the war of 1967 is of contention.69 However, 
water resources clearly played an important role in the war from an Israeli 
perspective. At stake in the war were water resources from both the Jordan River 
and the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank.  
At the time, many journalists noted the importance Israelis attached to 
obtaining ownership of water rights in the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank, 
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which before the war was a territory belonging to Jordan. Before the war, Israelis 
pumped water from the part of the Aquifer that lays inside the Green Line, but did 
not have ownership of the entirety of the aquifer. A majority of the access and 
recharge points of the aquifer are located in the West Bank. In addition to this 
issue, Israel was interested in gaining further access to resources of the Jordan 
River and its tributaries.  Jordan and Syria began the construction of the Maqarein 
dam in the West Bank, a project which intended to divert the waters of Jordan 
River for use in the two countries in accordance with the Johnston plan. This 
development is thought to have scared Israelis, who had been utilizing the 
resources of the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, of an impending water crisis.70 
There is some discussion as to whether or not the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 
was a “water war” or not. There have been claims that the war started over the 
beginning of construction of the Muhkeiba dam, another project designed to 
divert water from the Jordan River. Regardless of the veracity of this statement, it 
is obvious that water was an important factor in both the fighting of the war, as 
well as in its aftermath.71 
As a result of the war and the comprehensive Israeli victory, Israel gained 
access to ownership of the water of the Mountain Aquifer. Israel had feared that 
by failing to gain control over the Mountain Aquifer, it could lead to the increased 
salination and degradation of this important resource. Israel also gained increased 
water access from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers at the expense of Jordan and 
Syria. By gaining the Golan Strip from Syria, Israel increased its access to 
tributaries of the Jordan River and the Yarmouk River, as well as to Lake 
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Tiberias. Israel prevented Jordan from building structures that would divert water 
from the Yarmouk River, and also gained access to the Jordan via the Jordan 
River Valley in the West Bank. As a result of these gains, Israel, by the 1990s, 
consumed water resources from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers at a greater rate 
than called for by the original Johnston plan.72 
Until the 1990’s, Israel had a virtual status quo in their water resource 
situation. A few notable changes took place. In 1982, ownership of the water 
infrastructure in the West Bank was transferred from the Israeli military 
administration to Mekerot.73 In 1973, Mekerot began to construct the first 
desalination plant in Israel. This idea had long been considered by Israeli officials, 
and the gradual increase in the amount of water available through desalination has 
eased the sense of water scarcity.74  
In the 1990s, Israel’s water relations with its neighbors began to change. 
One agreement, as previously detailed, was reached with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization as part of the Oslo II Accords. In addition, Israel reached 
a water agreement with Jordan in 1994, as part of the two countries’ 
comprehensive peace treaty. This treaty served to mostly restore the allocation of 
East Bank water in the Johnston treaty back to Jordan, greatly increasing its water 
supply while having only a small negative effect on Israel’s access to water. 
Notably, bilateral negotiations between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon were 
held in order to attempt to increase water access for both countries from the 
Jordan river basin, similar to the negotiations held with Jordan. However, an 
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agreement was not struck between Israel and either country, and the post-67 water 
usage norms in those countries have remained the status quo.75  
This treaty remained the status quo for water access between Jordan and 
Israel until recently. In December of 2013, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority signed a preliminary agreement on water resources. The agreement 
included the construction of a new desalination plant in Aqaba, Jordan that would 
desalinate water from the Red Sea to produce freshwater that would be used in 
Jordan and Israel. The brine from this project would then be pumped into the 
Dead Sea via a pipeline in an attempt to reverse the trend of falling water levels in 
the Dead Sea. In addition, Israel would send additional fresh water from the Sea 
of Galilee to Jordan, while Palestinians would have the chance to buy some of this 
water from Israel. At the time of the agreement, the head of the Palestinian Water 
Authority, Shaddad Attili, claimed that the agreement did not significantly affect 
Palestinians, and he signed on as support for the Jordanians.76 Palestinian 
approval of the project was necessary due to its geographic proximity to the Dead 
Sea. 
Mr. Atilli’s analysis proved to be correct. In February 2015, a final 
agreement was reached between the parties. Following the final treaty, an advisor 
to the Israeli National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Minister stated that the 
Palestinian aspect of the water treaty would be dealt with separately.77 
Despite its shortcomings, what the latest Israeli-Jordanian water deal 
represents is promising. In Israel, despite traditional cultural attitudes of saving 
water, the sense of a water shortage has slowly eased. This is due to Israeli 
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technological advancements throughout many years in desalination, wastewater 
treatment, agricultural practices, and other demand side conservation tactics. This 
increase in water supply has the potential to allow Israel to supply additional 
water aid to their neighbors, as they have in both Jordan and Gaza. These new 
water deals could serve to be a beacon of cooperation in a region where positive 
relations between governments can be difficult to find. 
                  
The Breakdown of the Two-State Solution 
 
A key reason this paper recommends exploring the issue of water 
separately from a comprehensive peace deal is the bleak outlook of a peace deal 
being completed. The peace process between Israelis and Palestinians was jolted 
by the Oslo Agreements of 1993, and has been ambling forward since that time. 
For the purposes of this paper, I examine recent events and conditions that lead 
me to assert that the prospects of a comprehensive peace deal are dim at best. 
Long-term challenges include reaching final-status agreements on borders, the 
fate of Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem and agreements on the rights of 
Palestinian refugees. However, I only analyze particular obstacles that represent 
the difficulty of reaching a two-state agreement at current time.     
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Settlement Construction 
 
One of the main obstacles in pursuing a negotiated two-state agreement is 
continued construction and existence of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
Settlement construction has been fairly consistent in the West Bank since 1991, 
throughout the duration of peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. In 
a 2010 study, Neve Gordon and Yinon Cohen found that Israeli settler migration 
to the West Bank has continued unimpeded throughout the various peace 
negotiations since 1991, regardless of which political party is in control of the 
ruling coalition. The only stark downturn in settler migration occurred in 2001, 
most likely due to violence resulting from the second intifada. Gordon and Cohen 
found that the settler community in the West Bank grew from 89,800 in 1991 to 
311,100 in 2010. The natural growth rate for the settler community would have 
resulted in a population of 166,336, suggesting that 144,764 of the increase came 
as a result of migration into the settlements.78  
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Images Source: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2012.XLI.3.6  
More recently, Israeli settlement growth has been increasing in intensity 
under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Since he has been elected in 2009, the 
settler population has been growing at twice the speed of the rest of the Israeli 
population, growing 24% from the beginning of 2009 until the beginning of 2014. 
At that time, an estimated 355,993 Israeli settlers were residing in the West 
Bank.79 An estimated 80,000 of these settlers are residing in isolated settlements 
deep in the West Bank, unconnected to the network of settlements close to the 
1967-border.80 There is debate on the nature of the settlement growth under 
Netanyahu. Some, such as Israeli anti-settlement group Peace Now, claim that his 
administration has aided settlement construction in outposts deep inside the West 
Bank.81 Other observers view the large majority of Netanyahu’s settlement 
construction as taking place inside existing settlement blocs, which would, in all 
likelihood, be part of any negotiated Israeli state.82 
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Image source: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/12/world/middleeast/netanyahu-west-bank-
settlements-israel-election.html 
During the recent American-led peace negotiations, the American 
government repeatedly expressed their frustration at what they viewed as 
settlement construction that harmed the chances of reaching an agreement on a 
peace deal. In January of 2014, during negotiations, the Israeli government was 
asked by the American government to delay the announcement of new settlement 
construction projects to after a planned visit from Secretary of State John Kerry, 
sparing great embarrassment. It seems that Israeli leaders planned the 
announcement of new settlement buildings to coincide with the four planned 
releases of groups of Palestinian prisoners, a pre-condition of Palestinians 
entering negotiations.83 This suggests that Netanyahu had an interest in keeping 
the right-wing base of his coalition happy, at the expense of a possible agreement 
with the Palestinians. Following the breakdown of negotiations, and the Gaza war 
of the summer, Israeli settlement construction has continued with vigor. Part of 
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this settlement construction includes work in East Jerusalem, an especially 
contested area. Palestinians claim that East Jerusalem must be the capital of any 
future state, while Israelis desire Jerusalem as the undivided capital of a state for 
the Jewish people.84  
What this continuous settlement construction suggests is an attempt by 
multiple Israeli governments to change the factual situation on the ground in the 
West Bank to establish as wide a footprint as possible, increasing their leverage in 
future peace negotiations. Even Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 2004 settler 
evacuation and disengagement from the Gaza Strip has been suggested by many 
observers as a political ploy to consolidate their holding on territories in the West 
Bank.85 Recently, many key stakeholders have expressed their fear that the 
settlements will prove to be an obstacle that is too difficult to overcome in peace 
negotiations, especially following Netanyahu’s declaration that he does “not 
intend to evacuate any settlements.” Martin Indyck, the leader of the American 
team during the most recent peace negotiations, claimed the settlement 
construction had a “deeply damaging effect.”86  
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Image Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/22/map-the-spread-of-israeli-
settlements-in-the-west-bank/ 
 
As explained by Gordon and Cohen and a lengthy report in the New York 
Times by Jodi Rudoren and Jeremy Ashkenas, there is a fear that as settlement 
growth continues to expand it will be increasingly difficult to produce a map that 
provides a contiguous area of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank. In a 2005 
paper, Ghazi-Walid Falah argues that Israelis are pursuing a deliberate strategy of 
“Enclavisation” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He claims that Israel’s goals are 
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to isolate and surround Palestinian cities and villages to a degree which makes 
political control over the space unachievable for Palestinian governments. In 
addition, he goes as far to argue that the Israeli elite political class’s ultimate 
border goal is the inclusion of all of mandatory Palestine.87   
As Israeli settlement construction unilaterally changes the facts on the 
ground, it erodes trust between Israel and both the Palestinian Authority and the 
United States, its two partners in negotiations. It also pushes the Palestinian 
Authority to pursue unilateral moves to try to enhance its negotiating position.  
These steps include appealing to the UN for statehood, or threatening to submit a 
complaint to the International Criminal Court claiming the construction of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank constitute war crimes.88 All of these developments 
are viewed as negative by negotiators who hope to achieve a negotiated two-state 
settlement between the two sides.              
 
The Hamas-Fatah Split 
 
In January 2006, Islamist party Hamas won internationally-monitored 
Palestinian elections over their main rival and traditionally dominant Palestinian 
political party Fatah. In June of 2007, following several missteps by Fatah and the 
American, George W. Bush-led administration, Hamas took military control of 
the Gaza Strip, leaving Fatah in power in the West Bank.89 There have not been 
elections since 2006, and the power split between Hamas and Fatah remains, 
despite several stated attempts at forming Palestinian Unity Governments. 
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The split between Fatah and Hamas represents a challenge in overcoming 
successful negotiations, especially given Hamas’ traditional reluctance to accept 
negotiations with Israel as legitimate. If Israel and the Palestinian Authority were 
to come to an agreement that nominally led to an end-of-claims settlement, there 
is no indication that Hamas would sign on. Given that Hamas is in control of a 
sizeable share of Palestinian land and population, dealing with the split is a 
significant obstacle in achieving a negotiated settlement.90 Adding complexity to 
the split is the physical separation, in a sense enclavisation, of the two territories, 
allowing them to be governed entirely separately from one another. 
Hamas’ inflammatory language and attitude toward Israel results in Israeli 
refusal to negotiate with the group, a key problem of any negotiated settlement. 
Hamas’ charter denies the right of Israel to exist, and claims that the entire land of 
mandatory Palestine must be liberated from Zionist colonizers. Despite recent 
claims from leaders of Hamas that the charter is outdated and they will not follow 
it strictly, there have been repeated claims by several leaders that Hamas’ ultimate 
goal remains liberating the entire land of Palestine. Some Israeli-oriented voices, 
such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Ehud Yaari, advocate 
attempting to reach a hudna, or long-term armistice, with Hamas. He argues that 
such an agreement could be a moderating influence on Hamas, which already has 
internal voices pushing for reconciliation with Israel. Regardless of the possibility 
of reaching a temporary political agreement with Hamas, it will be near-
impossible for Israel to reach a comprehensive negotiated settlement with their 
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traditional enemy, as shown by Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent reaction to the 
Hamas-Fatah Unity Government.91  
 
Failed Negotiations, and a Telling Israeli Election 
  
In July of 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry began a new round of 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Prior to the talks, Secretary of State John Kerry 
stated the following regarding a two-state solution: “I think we have some period 
of time—in one to one-and-a-half to two years—or it’s over.” He also stated that 
he feared a third intifada if peace talks were to fail again.92 While talk of 
supposed last chances is often attached to peace negotiations in the conflict, it 
seems that this time there was a real sense of urgency when observers claimed 
that the two-state solution may not be achievable again in the near future if this 
round of talks were to fail. The reasons for this negative feeling about the future 
were numerous. They included longevity concerns regarding PA President 
Mahmoud Abbas, who was 77 at the beginning of negotiations. Israeli President 
and former Prime Minister Shimon Peres called Abbas the “best peace partner 
Israel could hope for,” and there is a sense of fear about the nature of any political 
leader who will inevitably have to replace him.93 Similarly, the Palestinian public 
is growing increasingly wary of what they view as corrupt Palestinian Authority 
rule, and political support for the PA may run out soon. One reason for shrinking 
support for the PA is a growing belief among Palestinians that peace negotiations 
with Israelis will prove fruitless, based on history of negotiations since Oslo.94 
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Yet another major reason is the growing Israeli settlement enterprise in the West 
Bank threatening to make constructing a sensible border plan a real challenge. For 
all these reasons, Kerry put a strong emphasis on the need for a deal during these 
negotiations. 
Even getting the two sides to the negotiating table proved to be a difficult 
task. Abbas wanted a settlement freeze in return for entering negotiations, which 
the Netanyahu government was unwilling to cooperate on. Ultimately, Kerry got 
the Netanyahu government to agree to release eighty Palestinian prisoners through 
four stages over nine months in exchange for Palestinian participation in 
negotiations. Netanyahu, on his end, was wary of entering negotiations, but felt 
pressured by the looming possibility of international isolation and a desire to 
maintain positive relations with the United States. He also traditionally had 
positive relations with Kerry, which helped him agree to enter the negotiations. 
Kerry, however, was unable to extract any agreement on settlement construction 
slowdown from the Israelis.95  
Ultimately, the talks proved to be a failure, despite massive effort by 
Kerry and the American team. With reaching a deal seemingly impossible by the 
nominal April 29th deadline, Kerry pushed to reach a framework agreement. 
However, the gaps on many issues were too far apart to forge an agreement 
between the two sides, including the presence of Israeli security troops in the 
Jordan valley, the status of East Jerusalem, and the fate of Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank. Notably, however, the Americans did gain valuable concessions 
from Netanyahu on the issue of borders (getting him to acknowledge pre-1967 
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borders as a guideline for negotiations) and accepting fault and providing 
compensation for refugees.96  
The talks broke down in the short-term for several reasons. The 
Palestinians, upset at what they saw as American attention and efforts focused 
disproportionately towards the Israeli side, grew frustrated with many 
developments. Each phase of prisoner releases was met with the announcement of 
new settlement projects, a move which greatly irked Palestinian lead negotiator 
Saeb Erekat. Then, it was revealed that a miscommunication had occurred 
between Kerry and Netanyahu. The fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners to be 
released was actually dependent on Israeli Knesset approval, surprising Secretary 
Kerry. The Knesset insisted upon having a vote because the prisoners in this batch 
were Israeli citizens, which potentially made their release more dangerous and 
politically tricky to deal with. As Israel deliberated about whether to release the 
prisoners, Abbas signed documents to have the Palestinian Authority join fifteen 
United Nations Conventions, yet notably refrained from taking the consequential 
action of joining the International Criminal Court.97 The talks seemed to get 
slightly better until April 23rd, when the PA, frustrated with the prisoner issue 
and not optimistic about achieving a favorable agreement, announced they were 
forming a unity government with Hamas. Israel, despite Hamas pledges that they 
eschew violence and favor negotiations with Israel, ended their participation in 
the talks, and the negotiations came to an abrupt halt.98  
In the aftermath of the breakdown, blame was thrown toward both sides in 
the negotiations. Palestinian negotiators were accused, including by right-wing 
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Knesset member Danny Danon, of not being concerned with the actual 
negotiations. Instead, critics said they were only focused on achieving the 
prisoner release that was stipulated by pre-negotiation agreements.99 Critics of the 
Israeli side, meanwhile, also claimed Israel was not interested in reaching an 
agreement. They claimed that Netanyahu never intended to sign a peace deal, and 
only used negotiations as a distraction while settlement construction continued.100 
Others did not go this far, but still pointed to Israeli settlement construction as the 
main factor in the failure to achieve an agreement.  
Following the failure of negotiations, three Israeli teenagers were 
kidnapped and killed in the West Bank. The Israeli government alleged the 
heinous crime was carried out by members of Hamas. Following collective 
punishment measures in the West Bank, Hamas began firing rockets towards 
Israel, leading to a 50 day war. While the war was obviously catastrophic in terms 
of human cost, this paper does not provide an in-depth report. Instead, the main 
takeaway from the Gaza war (other than damage to water infrastructure) for this 
paper is the further deepening of the conflict, which represents the security 
challenges that would be presented by a two-state comprehensive agreement.101 
Following the war, Israeli elections were held in March 2015. Fearing 
strong polling results by the Zionist Union party led by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi 
Livni, incumbent Prime Minister Netanyahu made a calculated gamble. He 
appealed to fears among Israelis of an increase in Arab voter turnout, due to the 
formation of the Joint List, a new cooperative venture between several Arab 
parties. Most tellingly, he reneged on his previous rhetorical support for a two-
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state solution, stating, “I think that anyone who is going to establish a Palestinian 
state today and evacuate lands is giving attack grounds to the radical Islam against 
the state of Israel.”102 The elections resulted in a clear victory for Netanyahu and 
his Likud party. This vote showed the current thoughts of Israeli voters. The 
voters chose a leader who, in emphasizing a traditionally security-based narrative, 
explicitly spoke out against the creation of a Palestinian state. Following the win, 
Netanyahu claimed that he does not actually oppose a two-state solution, yet his 
reconciliatory comments were not accepted by the American government.103 
What the election of Netanyahu symbolizes is clear. Israeli voters were 
given a choice largely between two governments: one primarily right-wing and 
the other center-left. The center-left party advocated returning to the negotiating 
table with the Palestinians and attempting to forge a peace. The right-wing leader 
stated that he had no intentions of pursuing a two-state solution, and urged Israelis 
to vote for him to ensure their security. The Israeli public picked the right-wing 
leader in Netanyahu through elections, showing that, overall, there is no strong 
popular sentiment toward pursuing a peace deal any time soon.104 Even more 
incriminating, Netanyahu beating the latest-available polling data suggests that he 
probably gained seats at least partially due to his late comments regarding the 
two-state solution and security.105 
The popular Palestinian mindset at the current time is mixed. In a 
landmark survey in June of 2014, during a time of immense tension following the 
kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, a majority of Palestinian 
citizens did not advocate a two-state solution. At this time, only 31% of 
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Palestinians in the West Bank and 22% of Palestinians in Gaza advocated a two-
state solution as a means of ending the occupation.106 Another important snapshot 
of Palestinian opinion are the latest polls from the Palestinian Center for Policy 
and Survey Research. Their most recent polls were conducted in late March 2015, 
following the Netanyahu election victory. There are many notable findings. 16% 
of survey respondents supported an unconditional return to peace negotiations, 
42% favor returning to negotiations if it meant an Israeli settlement freeze, and 
36% oppose returning to the negotiations no matter what. Looking at the recent 
reconciliation attempts between Hamas and Fatah, 42% were optimistic about the 
efforts while 54% were pessimistic about the efforts. A slightly encouraging sign 
is that a slight majority, 51%, supported a two-state solution, while 48% opposed 
it. However, 60% said that such an arrangement was no longer practical due to 
Israeli settlement growth. 82% of respondents believed that Israel’s long-term 
goals include annexing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while either expelling the 
population or denying them basic rights. Most of these signs point to a Palestinian 
public that had mixed feelings about the ultimate desire for a two-state solution, 
yet is fairly unanimous in the opinion that there is not a realistic chance of 
achieving it soon.107108         
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Why Water Cooperation Broke Down: Looking for Explanations 
 
As previously stated, water cooperation through the Joint Water 
Commission broke down in 2010. In looking for explanations as to why this 
cooperation broke down, I studied political events and polling data in the years 
leading up to the failure of the JWC. As I briefly argue, I believe the most logical 
explanation for the failure is a low belief on both sides that a two-state solution 
was obtainable, especially in the short term.  
Almost every major political event during the period of 2006-2010 had 
negative effects on the state of the relationship between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. First, in 2006, Hamas won free and fair elections. Following political 
competition, Hamas siezed control of the Gaza Strip in June of 2007. As 
previously detailed, this political separation of the two powers (especially with the 
violent nature of Hamas) has proved to be a difficult obstacle in reaching a peace 
agreement. 2007 also saw the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with 
the Annapolis conference hosted by President George W. Bush. Despite early 
optimism, it quickly became clear to some observers that this new round of 
negotiations would likely not produce a peace agreement. 109 The mood in Israel 
around this time shifted, as shown by the figure below. In January of 2006, 37% 
of Israelis thought that relations with Palestinians were getting worse. However, 
by July-August of 2007, that number had skyrocketed to 59%.110 
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The bad news continued in 2008 with the first in a series of Israeli-Hamas 
armed conflicts. The bloodshed was not fatal in terms of Israeli negotiations with 
the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, but served to create further instability and 
uncertainty in the political situation.111 In 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu was re-
elected as Prime Minister. At the time there was a negative feeling about what his 
election meant for the peace process. Shlomo Brom, Research Associate at the 
Institute for National Security Studies in Israel, stated, “"Netanyahu doesn't 
believe in the feasibility of a two-state solution and thinks permanent status 
solutions are a waste of time."112 In January of 2009, newly elected President 
Barack Obama appointed well-respected former Senator George Mitchell as his 
new Special Envoy to the Middle East, tasked with restarting negotiations 
between the two sides. However, his resignation in 2011 showed the frustration he 
felt in his failure to make any progress.113  
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The seemingly negative nature of these developments was concurred by 
polling data, especially on the Israeli side. While both Israeli and Palestinian 
support for the concept of a two-state peace solution remained stable between 
2008 and 2011, it seems as if faith was lost in the belief of the possibility of a 
peace agreement in the short-term. This added to the consistent negativity 
surrounding the possibility of any sort of agreement.  
The largest attitude change in this period is the decline in Israeli belief in 
the ability of American leaders to help negotiate a successful peace agreement. In 
2006, 55% of Israelis had belief that President Bush could lead negotiations that 
would result in a fair peace deal with the Palestinians. However, by 2010, that 
number dropped to 33%. Palestinians had negligible belief in President Bush 
consistently throughout this period.114  
 
Concurrently, Israelis slowly started to put less importance on reaching a 
peace agreement with Palestinians. 70% of Israelis in 2006 believed that reaching 
a peace deal was “very important” to ensure economic prosperity in the country, 
yet this number decreased to 57% in 2011. Similarly, the respondents who 
answered “very important” on the topic of the personal safety and security fell 
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from 81% to 71% during this time period. This overall shift suggests Israelis 
slowly started to put less urgency on reaching a peace deal with the 
Palestinians.115 
   
Adding to these dynamics is the general low belief that a peace deal could 
ever be reached. In a 2012 survey, 64% of Jewish Israelis, 68% of West Bank 
Palestinians, and 76% of Gaza Strip Palestinians all believed that a permanent 
peace between the two sides would not be achieved.116 
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Overall, I argue that there is a correlation between these notable shifts in 
both political events and attitudes, coupled with a low overall belief in the 
possibility of peace, and the breakdown of functioning in water institutions.  
 
Expert Interview Summary 
 
In order to get a sense of the feasibility of a new water agreement, I 
interviewed four experts in Israeli-Palestinian relations: Dr. Hani Al-Basoos – 
Professor of Political Science at the Islamic University in Gaza, Ghaith Al-Omari 
– Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Shira Kronich – 
Associate Director at the Centre for Transboundary Water Management: Arava 
Institute for Environmental Studies, and Dr. Nimrod Goren - Mitvim – The Israeli 
Institute for Regional Foreign Policies. Please see the appendices for transcripts of 
each interview. 
Overall, the largest takeaway from all of the participants is a lack of hope 
in achieving anything in the current political situation (with the slight exception of 
Dr. Al Basoos). Given the breakdown of peace negotiations led by the Americans, 
followed by the Gazan war of the summer of 2014, each participant felt as if there 
would be no major deal reached on water, or any issue, without a significant shift 
in the political situation. This adds to the challenge of finding a method of 
negotiations in which the two sides could engage on the issue of water.  
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Ultimately, the opinion of experts led me to believe that a stand-alone 
water agreement could not be reached on its own. However, this does not mean 
that a new water agreement needs to be contingent upon a final status agreement. 
Particularly drawing from the interviews with Dr. Goran and Ms. Kronich, I was 
led to the idea that if a new round of negotiations is to be commenced, a team of 
negotiators on both sides should be specifically devoted to reaching a new water 
deal. The successful implementation of a new water deal should not be contingent 
upon a comprehensive agreement being reached between the two sides.      
Dr. Al-Basoos stressed the necessity of changing the situation in Gaza, 
and described the current situation as extremely dire, with most water being too 
salty to consume. In the next few years, he expects the water problem in Gaza to 
grow to the point where it will be an extreme challenge for both the local and the 
Israeli governments. He thinks that water should be a humanitarian issue and that 
a political agreement on water should be based on the livelihoods of people, and 
not relegated to a final status agreement. While examining the potential for 
cooperation between the two-sides on water, he points to cooperation on other 
economic activity as well as Israel opening checkpoints to buy food in Gaza as a 
sign that cooperation is possible. A possible short-term solution in Gaza that he 
points to is the creation of a major desalination plant, yet he cites the expansive 
costs and the need for Israeli approval of these proposed projects as a potential 
stumbling block. If a new deal were to be reached, he believes it should be based 
on population needs. However, he believes that Israel would want to control water 
resources at a proportion similar to which they control land. 
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Mr. Al-Omari was very negative about the current political situation, and 
does not picture any agreement being reached in the near future. He believes that 
both sides will hold back on all issues, including water, to barter with in a final 
status agreement. In addition, he believes that it would be difficult to reach a 
water deal before a deal on permanent borders is struck, which would surely take 
place in a final status agreement. He stated than an interim deal may be possible, 
but not in the current political climate. If an interim deal were to be struck, he 
believes both sides would have to be strongly cajoled by the international 
community. He does see the need for a new agreement on water, based on the 
amount of time that has passed since the Oslo agreement. 
Ms. Kronich was also very pessimistic about reaching a water deal. She 
stated that the work she does is attempting to find interim solutions on the water 
issue, and yet she cannot see a situation on a new deal that could function on a 
state-to-state-level. Any action that is taken, she says, would probably be more 
unilateral, temporary actions on behalf of the Israelis, which she rightly points out 
is not exactly something to be optimistic about. One interesting need that she 
mentions is the need for Gaza’s water distribution infrastructure to be rebuilt, and 
that a simple increase in allocation by the Israelis would not be enough. If an 
interim agreement is reached, she feels it would be a disservice to the kind of 
post-conflict methodologies that should be used in terms of giving Palestinians 
more autonomy in accessing their water resources. In talking to Israeli 
government officials, she does feel that they realize the potential for humanitarian 
disaster in Gaza, and will allow the construction of a large-scale desalination 
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plant. In the future, she can picture a time when the desperation of Palestinians to 
access water will be part of the impetus of Palestinian officials to move toward a 
final status agreement.    
            Dr. Goren’s comments shed some light on how a possible water deal could 
be reached. While he agrees with the general consensus that the current political 
situation is not amenable to any sort of significant deal, he states that deals on 
issues that are not highly politicized, such as water, can be reached in the context 
of high-level final status agreement negotiations. While these negotiations are not 
in session, he states that there is no context for these smaller issues to be worked 
on. However, he thinks that a large round of negotiations could provide a platform 
for dedicated teams from each side to work on specific issues, such as water. Dr. 
Goren believes that any new negotiations would look different than the old 
system, with the EU playing a more prominent role alongside the US. While there 
are no negotiations currently ongoing, he still thinks temporary fixes for the water 
issue are possible.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendation    
 
The need for a revamping of water agreements between Israelis and 
Palestinians is clear. In the West Bank, residents face intermittent access to water 
at exorbitant prices. Their limited access to water forces them to pay more for 
clean drinking water, hurts their health, and stifles their economic opportunities. 
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The Joint Water Commission, once a symbol of cooperation between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians, has ceased to function for the past 5 years. In addition, the 
JWC is flawed in the sense that it gives Israelis veto power over Palestinian 
access to important water resources, yet Palestinians do not have veto power for 
water resources that are important to Israel. These conditions have led to 
Palestinians consuming water at a much lower rate than Israelis. 
  In Gaza, a water crisis is imminent. Despite the Israeli announcement that 
they will pump an additional 5 MCM of water a year into the Gaza Strip, totaling 
10 MCM, more needs to be done. The infrastructure to deliver water throughout 
Gaza is in disrepair after the summer war. 90% of water from the Coastal Aquifer, 
the only domestic source of water, is unfit for human consumption. The aquifer 
may be unusable by as early as 2016, and the damage could be irreversible by 
2020.  
Meanwhile, any prospects of striking a comprehensive peace deal in the 
near future seem nonexistent. The failure of the Kerry-led round of peace talks, 
followed by the Gazan war, the movement of the Palestinian Authority to join the 
ICC, and the re-election of Prime Minister Netanyahu seem to preclude an 
agreement being reached without a major shift in the political dynamics between 
the two sides. As a result of the continued failure to make political progress, the 
de-politicized issue of water has not been addressed since 1995, to the detriment 
of human needs and proper water management.  
In researching the issue and talking to experts, I was hoping that I would 
come to the conclusion that a complete overhaul of the situation should be 
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undertaken right away, separate from final status negotiations. However, as 
shown by interviews with experts on peace negotiations and the water 
management, the political situation at the moment is toxic, and not conducive to 
pursuing a large-scale agreement on any topic. Taking political realities into 
account, this paper instead advocates a two-pronged approach. The first is a series 
of temporary measures designed to ease humanitarian suffering, especially in the 
Gaza Strip. The second solution is a theoretical proposition if the political context 
shifts to a point where there are two sides interested in striking a comprehensive 
peace deal. In this situation, I advocate taking a slightly different approach than 
what has historically been the norm in negotiations towards a peace agreement.  
At present time, the water situation in Gaza and some parts of the West 
Bank is in need of immediate attention. If there is no significant action taken, the 
situation in Gaza is threatening to devolve into a humanitarian catastrophe. The 
Coastal Aquifer is consistently over-pumped and water distribution networks are 
severely damaged. Currently, many Gazans are forced spend a significant amount 
of their monthly incomes on water from private desalination plants, which provide 
water that is not adequately regulated.117 One of the only feasible solutions to the 
current problem is the construction of at least one large-scale desalination plant, 
such as the one currently being constructed by UNICEF and funded by the EU. 
There are several reasons from a Palestinian point of view to be hesitant of such 
an agreement, including fears of perpetuating the occupation, further isolation 
from the West Bank, and environmental consequences.118 However, if the 
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alternative is an ongoing humanitarian water crisis and continued over-pumping 
of the Coastal Aquifer, a desalination plant should be pursued.  
An important aspect of ensuring the success of this new desalination plant, 
as well as the utilization of currently dormant desalination plants in Gaza, is 
maintaining an adequate electricity supply to run the desalination plants. In 
addition, electricity is needed to adequately operate wastewater management 
plants.119 Israel must ensure that an adequate amount of electricity is supplied to 
Gaza to run both the desalination plants as well as the wastewater management 
plants.  
Yet another challenge in ensuring adequate water supply is the need for 
the delivery of construction materials to Gaza to rebuild damaged water 
infrastructure. Israel fears that construction material meant for peaceful purposes 
will be exploited by Hamas to build tunnels into Egypt.120 Hopefully, UN 
monitoring restrictions on the construction materials, as well as a realization by 
Hamas that they may face significant domestic discontent if the situation in the 
Gaza Strip does not improve, will ensure that construction materials are used for 
the correct purposes. I argue that if this is the risk that Israel faces in repairing 
damaged infrastructure, it is worth taking in order to prevent the deepening of the 
Gaza water crisis that could produce dangerous, unstable conditions. The 
deplorable water conditions could ultimately contribute to the outbreak of further 
war.  
While temporary solutions are not ideal, they are necessary to ease the 
suffering in Gaza, as well as preserve the future feasibility of the Coastal Aquifer 
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as a usable water resource. The good news is, as evidenced by the additional 
supply of water and Ms. Kronich’s interview, Israeli officials seem to be taking 
the water crisis in Gaza seriously. However, the struggle for Gazans to access 
adequate drinking water has been a long-standing problem, and not much has 
been done to alleviate the situation. Significant efforts by Israel, as well as 
funding by the international community, will need to be taken. 
While the first prong of my proposed plan seems somewhat obvious, the 
second suggested plan is a significant departure from how water and peace 
negotiations have operated in the past.  
As I have argued before, two-state negotiations over the past twenty-plus 
years have reached a stalling point. Faith in reaching an agreement in this manner 
is extremely low. Political developments have resulted in a situation with several 
significant impediments in reaching a deal. I also argue that cooperation on water 
issues has broken down as a result of the lack of confidence in an imminent two-
state agreement.    
What is needed is alternative methods of seeking an agreement, on both 
water and comprehensive peace negotiations. Despite decreasing support for a 
two-state solution, polling data indicates that it is still the desired solution to end 
the conflict.  According to a polling project done by the Zogby Research Services, 
47% of Palestinians state the two-state solution is desirable, while 40% of 
Palestinians think a solution is undesirable. Support is great among Israelis, with 
74% stating a two-state solution is desirable, and 23% stating it is undesirable. 
The difficulty in obtaining a two-state solution is shown by the confidence each 
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side has in the other’s interest in pursuing a two-state solution. Just 26% of 
Israelis think that Palestinians are interested in a two-state solution, while 59% are 
not confident. Similarly, 28% of Palestinians believe that Israelis are interested in 
a two-state solution, while 68% are not confident.121 This suggests that there 
needs to be trust-building actions taken by both sides. 
In order to jump-start the peace process and change the pattern of failures 
in peace negotiations, I argue that the international leaders of negotiations should 
push a different structure of negotiations. First of all, I argue that negotiations for 
the sake of negotiations should not be pursued. The continued failure of 
negotiations, as shown by polling data, decreases the credibility of third parties, as 
well as of each side, in their ability to deliver a peace agreement. Negotiations 
should only be started if a shift in the political situation occurs at some point in 
the near future that would be more amenable to striking a deal. This would most 
likely be due to degradation of the situation (potentially based on lack of water 
resources for Palestinians122) and a resulting increased domestic pressure, 
pressure from the international community, or significant leadership change on 
one or both sides. In addition, the composition of the leaders of negotiations 
should change. Both sides have shown a distrust in the Americans’ abilities to 
deliver a satisfying deal.123 As suggested by Dr. Goren, the EU, the Arab League 
and the UN could play a significantly larger role in any new round of 
negotiations.124  
If these conditions are met (no small feat), and the two sides meet again in 
peace negotiations led by an international coalition with the stated goal of a two-
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state solution, I argue that negotiators should consider holding a negotiation track 
focused solely on the issue of water. In my proposed method of negotiations, an 
agreement on water would not be contingent on a final status agreement. Based on 
previous cooperation and the need for reform that could potentially benefit both 
sides, I believe that water is the optimal topic to begin with. The water track of 
negotiations would be held early in the negotiations, simultaneous to the 
beginning of larger political negotiations. However, it would have an earlier 
deadline date than the overall track. 
If a water deal is reached within the context of larger negotiations, it could 
serve as a trust-building measure between the two sides to push the tougher 
political negotiations forward. If a water deal is reached without the completion of 
a final status agreement, the water deal would at least serve to improve the state of 
people’s lives on the ground, improving upon a process which has not yet served 
to improve the lives of the people. In addition, it could help to prevent 
environmental degradation of key water resources.   
Palestinians would obviously be inclined to negotiate on water due to their 
lack of access to water resources. The challenge for the international community 
would be properly incentivizing Israelis to reach an agreement on water. The 
natural motivations of Israel would largely stem from two desires: the first is the 
desire to avoid groundwater pollution from Palestinian illegal well-drilling and 
over-pumping. The second is the desire to prevent instability resulting from the 
inability of Palestinian citizens to access clean drinking water (especially if the 
situation further deteriorates). The international community, particularly the 
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United States, could also play a significant role in pressuring the Israelis to 
negotiate on water. Selling Israel on positive aspects of the water deal will be 
important.  
A potential model for the type of agreement that could be pursued is found 
in a report by Environmental NGO Friends of the Earth Middle East in November 
of 2010. The framework they propose is based on a more dynamic model of 
agreement than the Oslo framework. Joint cooperation on water is extended to all 
water resources between the two sides, rather than just the resources of the 
Mountain Aquifer.125 Water allocation is based on changing population and 
environmental realities, updating the Oslo Agreements which have not accounted 
for 20 years of population growth. They propose replacing the Joint Water 
Commission with two bodies, a Bilateral Water Commission and a dispute-
resolution body they name the Water Mediation Board. These boards would 
consist of an equal number of Israelis and Palestinians, as well as members of a 
third party.  
While this agreement does not necessarily need to be the framework for a 
new water deal, the principles of the deal resemble what a deal should be based 
on. The ultimate goal, if a water agreement is pursued as part of a two-state 
solution, is to end the mechanisms by which Israelis can affect Palestinian access 
to key water resources, without Palestinians having the same power. A truly 
cooperative, dynamic water management regime would also encourage greater 
environmental protection of water resources. 
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While this strategy of reaching an agreement is less than ideal, the broken 
state of relations between the Israelis and Palestinians mandates creative solutions 
from the international community. Unfortunately, I have come to believe through 
research on this paper that, given the current political situation, it is not possible 
to reach a water deal without the context of larger negotiations. While the 
necessary conditions I propose to enter negotiations are seemingly difficult to 
reach, I believe (and hope) the continued, yet shrinking, public support for a two-
state solution, changing demographics, growing international pressure, and the 
lack of clear alternative options will eventually push the two sides earnestly to the 
negotiating table. In addition, humanitarian concerns based on the lack of 
Palestinian access to adequate drinking water could be an important factor in 
bringing both sides back to the table. 
If both sides agree to new negotiations, I argue that in order for the 
negotiations to have a chance of being successful, new strategies will have to be 
pursued in order to avoid the repeated failures of the past. While there are several 
options for new strategies, I argue that starting with water makes sense for 
multiple reasons: it is not highly politicized, the two sides have shown the ability 
for some type of cooperation in the past, there is the ability for joint cooperation 
to be beneficial for both sides (especially given environmental concerns), and the 
potential opportunity to positively affect the lives of citizens on the ground.    
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Appendix A 
 
Dr. Hani Al-Basoos: Assocaite Professor of Political Science at Islamic 
University - Gaza  
ZZ: Do you believe that a water deal separate from a comprehensive peace deal 
between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority is possible? 
HB: Yes, it is possible. But taking into consideration the political situation now, it 
is not realistic now, but it may take time. It is a question of will, not if it is 
possible or not. The water issue has been one of the most problematic to the 
Israeli side. There is a large shortage of water in Gaza, maybe not as bad in the 
West Bank because of the large water resources and the lower population density. 
Water consumption is much less in the West Bank, and the water is much more 
pure. In the West Bank there is definitely the possibility of a deal, given the 
assistance of Mekerot. In Gaza the possibility is much less, given that Gaza is a 
coastal area, the water in Gaza is highly mixed with sea water that makes the 
water unfit to drink. Desalination technology is not available to cleanse the water. 
Clean drinking water is not available to all people, instead they have to buy from 
desalination companies, which costs money. Demand for these will only grow 
over the next few years because clean water resources are running out, so there is 
a need for an agreement with the Israeli side, because clean water could be a way 
for Israel to provide people with a source of life. There is a need for a political 
agreement on water, even if it is separate from a two-state solution. Water is 
needed because of the lack of technology and clean water resources. People are 
not feeling this need now, because you can buy water in cities, but in a few years 
the demand will increase. Politicians are not really aware of the situation because 
they are looking at political issues and confrontation with the Israeli side rather 
than the needs of the people, which include water. The agreement will need to be 
done with the PA, rather than political factions. Maybe the West Bank is not as 
dire, but it is definitely needed in the West Bank. There was talks of a major 
desalination station in the Mediterranean, but it is very expensive and requires 
Israeli approval, like any projects in Gaza. This agreement needs to be away from 
politics, because it concerns the livelihoods of people. Despite the fact, that water 
has been and Final Status Issue, and to me this is not fair. It is too important and 
needs to be dealt with separately.  
ZZ: Do you think that such a deal would be an effective political move for both 
the Israeli and Palestinian governments? 
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HB: I don’t think it will be effected, because it is not a security issue, not a major 
border confrontation, it is about everyday needs for both populations. It is 
something that is an issue for both peoples, we share both the sources of water. 
You can look in the West Bank with settlements and Palestinians side by side 
sharing water. Palestinians do not have the ability to dig down in the ground, yet 
Israelis have this water. For the Israeli side, it should not be political, it should be 
humanitarian, based on social and life needs. It should not be up to debate, an 
agreement should come sooner rather than later. 
ZZ: Do you think that such a deal has the potential to lead to increased 
cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians on other issues? 
HB: I think so, yes, cooperation could begin with water economy, and other 
aspects of public services, especially economy and water issues. Economy-wise 
there has been cooperation on both sides. Even in Gaza, Israel has opened up 
checkpoints for people to buy food and other goods from Israel and the West 
Bank and bring them to Gaza. In the West Bank, same thing. This is called 
Economic peace. When it comes to water, this is not up to debate, it should be a 
humanitarian issue. 
ZZ: Do you have a sense of what the content of would contain? 
HB: I think it should be based on sharing the water resources based on the needs 
for both societies. This should be the basis, but I don’t think the Israeli side would 
accept, because the size of the land shared between the Israelis and the Palestinian 
side, you see Palestinians having control of about 10% of the whole area, while 
Israel controls 90% of mandatory Palestine. If it is based on land, Israel will have 
90% of water with Palestinians 10%. If it is based on population needs, I think it 
would be more 50/50, or even 40/60, because the Palestinians in the WB and 
Gaza are about 4 million while Israelis are 6 million. But I don’t think Israelis will 
agree with this, because you see where the PA has control it is only 10% of the 
land. But I don’t think even the water resources have been used completely based 
on the side of the land, but a little more on need. You see this in Israel, with Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem and other places where the water is used in these cities. You 
see water resources available in other areas, but they are not used. This would 
take some work on areas that are not populated. But this goes back to the political 
question of how the water would be shared.  
 
 
 
 
   76 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Ghaith Al-Omari: Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
ZZ: Do you believe that a water deal separate from a comprehensive peace deal 
between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority is possible? 
GO: If you want to look at this substantively, well actually, let me take a step 
back. First of all, politically speaking, it is very hard to see that, because the 
Palestinians and Israelis tend to hold back on these issues until they reach to 
produce a formula for final peace negotiations. So to have a complete agreement 
would be unlikely. Secondly, so this is politically speaking. Now, substantively 
speaking, any final water agreement would be dependent on a borders agreement. 
Because allocation of water resources is based on what resources are under your 
territory and what resources are under the other country’s territory. So it would be 
difficult to have a final water agreement until there is a final borders agreement. 
So the question that is in my head about this is, is there a deal that is possible that 
is interim in nature? And that, I think, substantially is possible but politically is 
unlikely. 
ZZ: Do you have a sense of what such an interim deal would look like? 
GO: Actually, I’m not sure, this is not my issue. A lot of the substance would 
come down to the technical issue of how you allocate water rights, and in this, 
international law is not very clear. I think that, with international law being 
unclear, I think it is unclear what any interim deal would look like. 
ZZ: Do you believe that a deal separate from a comprehensive peace deal on any 
subject would be possible or desirable for either side? 
GO: I actually think that given that … I think anything that could be agreed on at 
this point, would have both sides, the Palestinian and the Israelis. But you have to 
keep in mind that certain issues are interlinked. And accordingly would be dealt 
with in a package deal. However, I think it’s important to identify issues that have 
been agreed on in the past that can be renegotiated and rethought on the interim 
aspects of these deals. Oslo was negotiated about 20-some years ago, and I think 
it’s there are differences since then that should be taken into account.  
ZZ: Politically selling to their own sides? 
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GO: I actually think the two sides, left to their own devises, would not reach a 
deal. With both sides, there is no political incentive to negotiate. This is where 
they need to have the international community push them to a deal.  
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Shira Kronich: Associate Director at the Centre for Transboundary Water 
Management 
ZZ: Do you believe that a water deal separate from a comprehensive peace deal 
between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority is possible? 
SK: I don’t think so. 
ZZ: Do you think that’s because the nature of water politics itself, or do you think 
that’s a reflection of the politics of the situation? 
SK: I’m not able to say from my experience that a solution is possible that is not 
part of a comprehensive agreement between the states. I don’t see a water 
agreement being reached outside of kind of the mechanisms that are forced on the 
situation, some sort of management by the Civil Administration and the Joint 
Water Council that theoretically works but doesn’t actually, practically allow 
projects to move forward. Even if, I just feel very contradictory, because the work 
I do is about finding interim solutions, but I don’t think that a water agreement at 
a government or state level between the two states would be reached between the 
two-states before a final status agreement. I think it’s a justice issue, it can’t be 
ignored, I think reparations need to be made about the lack of water supply and 
access to water resources for the Palestinians, but I can’t imagine an agreement 
outside a final status agreement. 
ZZ: Is there any issue that you think a comprehensive deal could be reached on, or 
do you think that it is the nature of the political situation as it is now that a new 
deal won’t be reached until a final status agreement is reached? 
SK: It’s tough for me to compare, because I don’t work as deeply in other fields, 
but I think there is an added political element to the water agreement. I think that 
other comprehensive agreements, as you call them, can be made in a more 
bilateral approach between both riparians or both states to jointly decide on 
management is potentially possible in other fields before a comprehensive 
solution just because of its practically necessary because of the practicality of it, 
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but with the water because it effects development, but so do other environmental 
issues.  
No I don’t think so, I think all solutions which will be found in the interim would 
be more unilateral than bilateral. We can develop interim solutions that promote 
food security, water security, livelihood security but I think they’re all temporary 
and a compromise on what can be done if we move towards post-conflict 
development and methodologies that have more autonomy on the Palestinian side. 
ZZ: Do you see Israel, any time soon, taking any of these unilateral actions, in 
respects to water, such as they did with Gaza? 
SK: I hope to be wrong in that we’ll see the results on the ground looking 
different than those agreements or statements, but the reality on the ground in 
Gaza in terms of the water situation is very dire, separate to kind of those claims. 
So I’m not sure if those will be effected, I’m waiting to see when this new water 
is supplied, how it is distributed when the infrastructure has been so desperately 
taken apart. The situation in Gaza with water needs very serious investment in 
infrastructure in terms of a massive desalination plant. I think anything other than 
that is a very Band-Aid solution. 
ZZ: Do you see, in the future, UNICEF announced a massive desalination project 
which is supposed to be online in 2016, do you think that that desalination plant 
will come online or are you optimistic about any other desalination project? 
SK: I think the Israeli government, from the water sector perspective, so these are 
the Israeli government officials that I have more interaction with other than what 
is reported in media, I think that they recognize that something very substantial 
needs to happen very soon. So I am slightly more optimistic about it, but it’s hard 
to call it optimistic, because the government and the political situation has 
allowed it to become so dire that there isn’t any other solution than to invest in 
massive infrastructure for Palestine, specifically in the Gaza Strip. So I do 
actually think that we have no other solution and a large-scaled desalination plant 
will be built in Gaza and, like you said, allocations will increase, because 
distribution systems are so malfunctioning that they can’t rely on the quantities 
they used to, and will have to increase the quantities. So, it is kind of as a result of 
things getting much worse that it requires a universal kind of decree, so I’m not 
sure that we can claim that that’s a positive response to the situation. 
 
On the other hand, I’m hearing from mainly Palestinian sources that this will be 
part of the impetus towards a more final status agreement, because we can’t keep 
the status quo as an interim solution. So maybe, in the end, similar in Gaza, the 
desperation of the situation will force forward a political agreement.   
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Appendix D 
Dr. Nimrod Goren: Chair, Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign 
Policies 
ZZ: Do you believe that a water deal separate from a comprehensive peace deal 
between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority is possible? 
NG: And you’re talking about a big water deal or just things along the way? 
ZZ: Both I’m examining a big water deal, and that right now seems pretty 
impossible with the political situation, but also an interim deal in the short term as 
well, whatever you think is possible. 
NG: You can get some reach some understanding on some ad hoc issues, but the 
higher level water strategic issues will be related to the higher political issues 
eventually, they are not moving forward without progress on the official 
negotiation track. What is going forward is usually involving both sides and also 
Jordan, so it’s not merely bilateral but it’s in a regional umbrella, in Israeli-
Palestinian-Jordanian projects. There’s the project on the Dead Sea, on issues that 
are less politically divisive.  
ZZ: Do you think that reaching a smaller deal would be an effective political 
move for both the Israeli and Palestinian governments in selling to their domestic 
constituencies? 
NG: I think it’s mostly for the Palestinians to benefit for the deal, because they 
have the greater need. I don’t think Israel is willing to give up what the Pals are 
asking for, because they don’t want to benefit the Pals while they are pursuing 
international actions. So with some issues, not necessarily water, mutual 
agreements reached before the political progress is sometimes conditioning. 
Agreements to give the Palestinians taxpayer money, or other issues, may change 
Palestinian policy in the international arena. Part of the Palestinian society, I think 
the will among the population is to see a political revival. It’s not only about the 
here and now, but also to see hot it leads to a more significant change in terms of 
politics.  For example, the city of Rawabi, the fact that it is not connected to 
water, the basic aspects of the water issues are not moving forward, and are being 
tied down to Palestinian movements internationally. So, the prospects to move 
forward on the bigger issues is not there at the moment.  
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ZZ: Do you think that a deal on a smaller issue, such as water, could lead to 
enhanced trust and progress on the bigger political situation? 
NG: I think it can be done only it a different political context. If we are talking 
about smaller steps that should help trust and confidence building measures to 
assist in more difficult negotiations, that makes sense. But now, you even do not 
have a negotiation process going on, then the smaller issues cannot be a 
substitute. For example, at the current time, which you do not even have bilateral 
negotiations going on, the ability to move forward on the smaller issues is less so 
than if you have negotiations that are not going anywhere because within the 
context of political negotiations you can have teams working on the smaller 
issues. Having some sort of negotiation process on the final status issues gives 
legitimacy to make progress on the smaller issues. Once you don’t have the final 
status agreement negotiation going on at all then the smaller issues are frozen. 
Because there is no legitimacy for either side to move forward on those issues. Or 
no context that makes sense to move forward, and the culture on between the 
sides becomes very combative. It turns into a zero-sum-game, and then they do 
not look for areas of cooperation but rather it’s one side wins over the other. So, 
one of the answers is to find a way to make progress on the bigger political issues 
and then make progress on the smaller ones.  
ZZ: So in starting the progress on the big issues, do you think that the best way to 
move forward is an internationalization of the conflict, with a bigger role for the 
EU? Or do you think it will be classic United States-led? What do you think is the 
best way to change the political context? 
NG: The prospect for renewed negotiations is not high at the moment, because the 
leadership on both sides are not interested. The expectation now if for the IC to 
take some steps. The question is whether the IC would be led by the US as before 
if will the EU a bigger say? I think it will be a US dominated process that gives 
the EU more space. Because, it’s a bit convenient for the Americans to have the 
Europeans, for example, put more pressure on Israel. It is something that the 
American administration, even, perhaps behind closed doors encourages the 
Europeans to do because they cannot do it themselves. So it’s better for US 
diplomacy to have EU label settlement products, a move which the US could 
never. So it’s like the leading from behind thing. The US is very much there, but 
sometimes it’s more convenient to have a European, like the French for example, 
draft the UN resolution and not the US. It has to be a more combined effort now, 
it can’t just be the Americans it also has to be the Araba League, the Arab 
Countries, the Europeans, and the Americans, and the UN is coming a much more 
important vehicle in for which this international coordination can be carried out. 
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